The dollar amounts reported in column (d) represent the average of the amounts reported for our Non-PEO NEOs as a group in the “Total” column of the Summary Executive Compensation Table in each applicable year. During 2025, our non-PEO NEOs consisted of Clark R. Moore, Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Paul A. Pinkston, former Chief Accounting Officer and Jody D. Crook, Chief Commercial Officer and during 2024 and 2023, our non-PEO NEOs consisted of J. Douglas Schick, President, Clark R. Moore, Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, and Paul A. Pinkston, former Chief Accounting Officer.

Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”), in the event of misconduct that results in a financial restatement that would have reduced a previously paid incentive amount, we can recoup those improper payments from our Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer (if any). The SEC also recently adopted rules which direct national stock exchanges to require listed companies to implement policies intended to recoup bonuses paid to executives if the company is found to have misstated its financial results. Additionally, on November 8, 2023, the Board of Directors of the Company adopted a Policy for the Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Incentive-Based Compensation (the “Clawback Policy”), to comply with the final clawback rules adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under Section 10D and Rule 10D-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Rule 10D-1”), and the listing standards, as set forth in the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (the “NYSE Rules” and, together with Rule 10D-1, the “Final Clawback Rules”). The Clawback Policy provides for the mandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation from current and former officers of the Company as defined in Rule 10D-1 (“Covered Officers”) in the event the Company is required to prepare an accounting restatement as specified in the Clawback Policy. Under the Clawback Policy, the Board of Directors may recoup from the Covered Officers erroneously awarded incentive compensation received within a lookback period of the three completed fiscal years preceding the date on which the Company is required to prepare an accounting restatement. The Clawback Policy is effective as of October 2, 2023.

A copy of the Clawback Policy is incorporated by reference into the 2025 annual report as Exhibit 97.1.

As previously disclosed in the Current Report on Form 8-K filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 25, 2025, in connection with the preparation of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, the Company concluded that in prior years it had not appropriately accounted for the depletion expense related to its oil and gas properties. These errors led to an overstatement of depletion expense during the impacted periods.

On March 28, 2025, the Audit Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, after discussion with senior management and the Company’s independent registered public accountants, concluded that the errors were material to the (i) audited consolidated financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, originally included in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023 (the “2023 10-K”), and (ii) audited consolidated financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022, originally included in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022 (the “2022 10-K”)(collectively, the “Form 10-Ks” and the “Prior Financial Statements”) and that the Prior Financial Statements as of and for the fiscal years ended December 31, 2023 and December 31, 2022, included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, should no longer be relied upon due to the impact of the unintentional error noted above. Such Prior Financial Statements were subsequently restated by the Company to correct the errors discussed above.

The Company determined that the restatement described above would not result in the recoupment of any compensation because none of the Company’s prior incentive compensation was based on the achievement of any specific net income or other milestones which were affected by the restatement, and because the restatement resulted in an overall increase in net income in the affected periods. Accordingly, the restatement did not impact the Company’s executive compensation payments and the Company determined that there were no payments required to be pursued under the Company’s Policy for the Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Incentive-Based Compensation.

On October 27, 2025, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, after discussion with the Company’s senior management and the Company’s former independent registered public accounting firm, Marcum LLP (“Marcum”), which audited the Company’s financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, concluded that the Company’s previously issued audited financial statements included in the Company’s audited consolidated financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, originally included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024 (the “Prior 2024 Financial Statements”) filed with the SEC on March 31, 2025, should no longer be relied upon and should be restated due to an error in the accounting for the prior period net operating losses in the calculation of the tax provision for the impacted period (the “Error”). This Error resulted in an overstatement of the Company’s tax benefit and deferred income tax account during the impacted period. Such Prior 2024 Financial Statements were subsequently restated by the Company to correct the errors discussed above.

The Company determined that the restatement of the Prior 2024 Financial Statements would not result in the recoupment of any compensation because none of the Company’s prior incentive compensation was based on the achievement of any specific net income or other milestones which were affected by the restatements.  Because the restatements did not impact the Company’s executive compensation payments, the Company determined that there were no payments required to be pursued under the Company’s Policy for the Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Incentive-Based Compensation.

The Company has an insider trading policy governing the purchase, sale and other dispositions of the Company’s securities that applies to all Company personnel, including directors, officers, employees, and other covered persons. The Company also plans to follow procedures for the repurchase of any shares of its securities. The Company believes that its insider trading policy and planned repurchase procedures are reasonably designed to promote compliance with insider trading laws, rules and regulations, and listing standards applicable to the Company. A copy of the Company’s insider trading policy was filed as Exhibit 19.1 to the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024.

The policy also prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of any nonpublic information acquired in the workplace and the misuse of material nonpublic information in securities trading and includes specific anti-hedging provisions.

To ensure compliance with the policy and applicable federal and state securities laws, all individuals subject to the policy must refrain from the purchase or sale of our securities except in designated trading windows or pursuant to preapproved 10b5-1 trading plans. Even during a trading window period, certain identified insiders, which include the named executive officers and directors, must comply with our designated pre-clearance policy prior to trading in our securities. The anti-hedging provisions prohibit all employees, officers and directors from engaging in “short sales” of our securities or from trading in options.

Relationship Between “Compensation Actually Paid” and Performance

We generally seek to incentivize long-term performance, and therefore do not specifically align our performance measures with “compensation actually paid” (as computed in accordance with the Pay Versus Performance Rules) for a particular year. In accordance with the Pay Versus Performance Rules, we are providing the following descriptions of the relationships between information presented in the Pay Versus Performance table.

Compensation Actually Paid and Net Income (Loss)

Our company has not historically looked to net income (loss) as a performance measure for our executive compensation program. Our net income (loss) was ($10,362) thousand, $12,293 thousand and $1,699 thousand, in 2025, 2024 and 2023, respectively. The table below also does not show any correlation between compensation actually paid and net income (loss).

Compensation Actually Paid and Cumulative TSR

As shown in the following graph, the compensation actually paid to our PEO and the average amount of compensation actually paid to our non-PEO NEOs as a group (excluding our PEOs) during the periods presented do not have any correlation. While equity awards values can be impacted by changes in our stock price each period, over the three years set forth below, our stock price did not materially impact PEO and non-PEO NEO compensation. In general we believe that equity awards align our executive officers’ interests with those of our stockholders by providing a continuing financial incentive to maximize long-term value for our stockholders and by encouraging our executive officers to continue in our employment for the long-term.

The Compensation Committee and the Board of Directors have not established policies and practices (whether written or otherwise) regarding the timing of option grants, stock appreciation rights and similar awards, or other awards, in relation to the release of material nonpublic information (“MNPI”) and do not take MNPI into account when determining the timing and terms of stock option or other equity awards to executive officers. The Company does not time the disclosure of MNPI, whether positive or negative, for the purpose of affecting the value of executive compensation.